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Abstract. This study develops a novel conceptual framework to understand the differ-
ential impact of formal institutional regime shift in intellectual property rights on the
innovation and patenting strategies of Chinese and Western firms operating in China.
We argue that to the extent that Chinese firms have been deeply embedded in China’s
informal institutions, they are less responsive to formal institutional changes thanWestern
firms operating in China. Using the major China patent law reform of 2001 as an exoge-
nous event, we find results consistent with our key arguments: With the strengthening
of the previously weak (utility model) patent protection, Chinese firms are less likely to
apply for such patents to safeguard their innovations than Western firms. However, this
difference becomes less pronounced in regions with higher quality intellectual property
rights and legal institutions that foster research and development and innovation, and
whenWestern firms gain longer operational experience in China. This study advances our
understanding of the intricate interaction between formal and informal institutions and
specifically how “stickiness” may arise in their substitutive relationship because of the
embeddedness of firms in informal institutional environments. It also provides important
implications for policy and innovation strategies for policy makers and firms in emerging
economies.
Keywords: intellectual property rights • innovation strategy • institutional change • emerging economy • China
1. Introduction
How institutions influence organizations’ strategic res-
ponses, such as their innovation behaviors, has long
intrigued researchers. The economic activities of a soci-
ety are usually embedded in its institutional settings,
which include both formal and informal ones. As “the
rules of the game in a society” (North 1990, p. 3), for-
mal institutions represent structures of codified rules
and standards. Conversely, informal institutions are
enduring systems of noncodified normative and cogni-
tive understanding, socially constructed practices, and
social relations that shape the behavior of and interac-
tion among individuals or organizations (Granovetter
1985, North 1990, Scott 1995). These formal and infor-
mal institutions define both constraints on and oppor-
tunities for economic actions and shape organizational
decision making and strategic outcomes (Hiatt et al.
2009, Peng and Luo 2000, Tolbert et al. 2011, Webb
et al. 2009).
A change in formal institutions can influence reward
and sanction structures in an economy and have impor-
tant impacts on firms’ strategic behaviors (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983, Hirsch 1975, Tolbert et al. 2011).
For example, improved formal institutions for intellec-
tual property rights (IPR) in a host country affect the
country’s innovation positively through the increase
of inward foreign direct investment in research and
development (R&D) (Khoury and Peng 2011), the
improvement of industrial development in host coun-
tries (Branstetter et al. 2011), international technol-
ogy transfer, and firms’ innovative output (Branstetter
et al. 2006, Helpman 1993). As another example, major
changes in banking law in an emerging market to pro-
mote greater savings and foreign investment are found
to have an important impact on firms’ acquisition and
diversification behaviors (Perez-Batres and Eden 2008).
However, what has been underexplored in the litera-
ture is how firms’ response to improved formal institu-
tions may be influenced by their embeddedness in the
existing informal institutions. This issue is especially
pertinent for firms operating in transitional economies
and developmental states that have been relying heav-
ily on informal institutions but are undergoing a sub-
stantial transformation in formal institutions in the
meantime (Evans 1995, Peng 2003). Previous studies
indicate that formal and informal institutions are sub-
stitutive: generally, when formal institutions are weak
and inefficient, firms tend to rely more on informal
institutions (Batjargal et al. 2013, Holmes et al. 2013,
Webb et al. 2009, Xin and Pearce 1996). On the other
hand, when formal rules are clearly stipulated and
effectively enforced in developed countries, informal
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institutions tend to become less crucial in economic
activities (e.g., Branstetter et al. 2006). Extending this
logic, one would anticipate that as formal institutions
improve in these transitional economies, firms respond
more to formal institutions and thus rely less on infor-
mal ones (e.g., Ahlstrom and Bruton 2006, Child and
Tse 2001, Guthrie 1998). This prediction, however, fails
to take into consideration the complexity of the substi-
tutive relationship between formal and informal insti-
tutions. To the extent that the embeddedness of firms
in the existing informal institutions may increase the
inertia or resistance of firms in adapting to the envi-
ronmental change (e.g., Greenwood and Hinings 1993,
1996; Oliver 1991; Zucker 1991), firms with differen-
tial institutional embeddedness may respond differ-
ently to the improvement in formal institutions—more
deeply embedded firms may exhibit greater “sticki-
ness” in their response. Yet, this logic has remained
largely underinvestigated in prior studies on the sub-
stitution between formal and informal institutions.
An understanding of such intricacy in the interaction
between formal and informal institutions in the emerg-
ing economies has important policy and strategy impli-
cations for firms operating there.
One of the main objectives of this paper, therefore,
is to fill this gap by integrating the streams of work
on institutional embeddedness of firm and strategy
(e.g., Hitt et al. 2004, Oliver 1991, Furman and Stern
2011) into the literature on the interaction between
formal and informal institutions. We are interested in
studying how an improved formal institution’s effect
on firms’ strategic responses may vary depending
upon the differential embeddedness of firms in infor-
mal institutions. To do this, we examine the impact
of an exogenous change in formal IPR institutions in
China on the differential responses of Chinese firms
and Western firms operating in China. China imple-
mented one of the most significant amendments in
its IPR laws in 2001, after which its IPR legal frame-
work substantially improved and better converged
with international IPR regulations. This exogenous
“shock” provides an ideal context to unravel the effects
of a formal institutional change on strategic responses
of firms. In addition, we examine the first-order effect
of the IPR law change on the difference in patent-
ing strategies of Chinese and Western firms operat-
ing in China, given their differential embeddedness in
China’s informal institutions. We argue that because
of China’s relative weakness and inefficiency in for-
mal institutions and Chinese firms’ deep embedded-
ness in informal institutions, Chinese firms tend to
resolve conflicts associated with innovative activities
by resorting to informal institutional norms and prac-
tices, which emphasize the avoidance of direct conflict
and respect for authority and relationships. By con-
trast, Western firms are generally less embedded in
China’s informal institutional environment but more
accustomed to and rely more on formal rules and reg-
ulations. We thus predict that, all else equal, domestic
Chinese firms may not be as responsive to changes in
formal institutions (e.g., formal IPR laws) as Western
firms operating in China.
While the difference in the embeddedness in infor-
mal institutions is most pronounced between local
Chinese firms and Western firms, variations are pos-
sible in such embeddedness, which would moderate
the first-order effect if our argument is valid. Thus,
we further investigate these variations. First, Chinese
firms may have differential embeddedness in informal
institutions across regions. In regions with relatively
high de facto institutional quality, Chinese firms’ rel-
ative embeddedness in informal institutions is lower
compared to that in other regions. As a result, their
responses to IPR change are expected to be stronger
than those in regions with low de facto institutional
quality. Second, Western firms may increase their
embeddedness in China’s informal institutions with
an increase in their operational experience in China.
Therefore, we argue that the difference in responses to
IPR change by Chinese andWestern firms is smaller (i)
when the technologies are developed in regions with
higher de facto institutional quality for fostering and
protecting R&D and innovation, and (ii) whenWestern
firms have accumulated more local experiences and
knowledge as their operational experience in China
increases.
This study seeks to make the following contribu-
tions. First, we extend prior research on substitution
between formal and informal institutions by propos-
ing that greater embeddedness in informal institutions
leads to stickiness in firm response to an improvement
in formal institutions, hence enriching our understand-
ing of the dynamics of the substitutive relationship.
In particular, we suggest that firms’ deep embed-
dedness in informal institutions may cause organiza-
tional resistance and insensitivity to changes in formal
institutions (e.g., Greenwood and Hinings 1996, Peng
2003). Firms may be “locked” in their prevailing (infor-
mal) institutional environment, which might reduce
the firms’ propensity to adopt new formal institutions.
Thus, even as formal institutions strengthen, the poten-
tial substitution effect of formal institution for infor-
mal institution may be constrained for more deeply
embedded firms than for less embedded ones. As such,
we identify important contingencies under which the
substitutive effects may be reduced or strengthened
over time.
Second, we conceptualize how firms may seek alter-
native protection against expropriation in innovations
through informal institutional approaches, norms, and
informal guanxi networks (or personalized connections
or relationships of influence) (Granovetter 1985, 1993;
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Uzzi 1996) that deeply characterize the Chinese society
and its transitional economy. Previous studies consider
how entrepreneurs and firms acquire critical resources
given the complex interaction between formal and
informal institutions (e.g., Batjargal et al. 2013, Hiatt
et al. 2009, Hitt et al. 2004, Holmes et al. 2013, Tonoyan
et al. 2010). We add to this line of research by suggest-
ing that firms can leverage informal institutions as an
alternative means to formal institutions in the protec-
tion of their intellectual property assets, especially in
the emerging economy context.
Third, we complement previous research which fo-
cused on variation in institutional environments across
countries at specific points in time (e.g., Batjargal et al.
2013, Hitt et al. 2004) by examining the temporal and
spatial effects of institutional change within a country
on firms’ innovation strategies. To do this, we incorpo-
rate a novel research design using transnational China–
U.S. patent dyads and exploit a major, top-down IPR
law reform in China as an exogenous event which,
together with appropriate controls, can help mitigate
to a certain extent concerns of reverse causality and
endogeneity that have hindered some previous strat-
egy studies in this area.
2. Theory and Hypothesis Development
Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society” as
well as the social structures that create, embody, and
enforce these rules (North 1990, p. 3). They both facil-
itate and constrain human interaction. Formal insti-
tutions represent structures of codified or formally
accepted rules and standards that shape the interac-
tion among societal members, whereas informal insti-
tutions are enduring systems of traditions, societal
norms, and practices, and unwritten codes of conduct
that reflect a socially constructed reality and define the
shared expectations and acceptance of behaviors by
members of a society (Hiatt et al. 2009, Hiatt and Park
2013, North 1990, Scott 1995).
When disputes or malfeasance arise from the inter-
actions between individuals or organizations in a
society, they can resort to either formal or informal
institutions for resolution (North 1990). The infor-
mal institutions—the norms, practices, and networks
that embody them—are characterized by trust, per-
sonal ties, and shared expectations instead of contrac-
tual agreements as in formal institutions (Asanuma
1985, Dore 1983, Evans 1996a, Gerlach 1992, North
1990, Smitka 1991). Resolution through informal insti-
tutions relies more on long-term cooperative relation-
ships (Dore 1983, Romo and Schwartz 1995) instead of
maximizing economically rational goals and immedi-
ate financial gains. Thus, informal institutions enable
opportunities that cannot be easily obtained through
the market or legal transactions (Hiatt et al. 2009,
Tolbert et al. 2011). At the same time, informal insti-
tutions influence and constrain the choice and behav-
ior of individual and organizational decision makers
through their cognitive and normative considerations
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Granovetter 1985, Hiatt
and Sine 2014, Hirsch 1975, Scott 1995).
On the other hand, formal institutions are the formal
codified rules and standards that reflect the motiva-
tion and collective actions of societal members seek-
ing to solve economic or social problems that obstruct
the ability to achieve goals deemed to be important
(DiMaggio 1988). Compared with informal institu-
tions, formal institutions are more malleable because
they can be consciously and purposely designed
by human agency (e.g., through policy intervention;
Scott 1995).
2.1. China’s Formal IPR Institution and
IPR Reforms
The legal and regulatory protection of IPR, such as
patent laws, is one of the most important aspects of
formal institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001, Huang and
Murray 2009, North 1990). Intellectual property rights
facilitate firms’ innovative activities by providing pro-
tection against expropriation, therefore increasing the
incentives for firms to innovate and grow (Hu and
Png 2013, Levin et al. 1987, Nordhaus 1969). Compared
with the developed Western countries that have long
established clear and strong legal protection of IPR,
emerging economies such as China suffer from insti-
tutional inadequacies (Ginarte and Park 1997, Huang
2017). Although the Chinese IPR system has been in
existence for more than two decades (since 1985) and
has undergone reforms, it is a relatively young system
that requires further improvements comparedwith the
long-established IPR system in the developed Western
nations (Huang 2010).
Essentially, two types of patents are available from
the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) of China
for Western and Chinese firms developing their tech-
nologies and seeking formal IPR protection in China:
invention patents and utility model patents.1 The
invention patent awarded by the SIPO is the strongest
form of formal IPR protection in China. It is protected
for 20 years from the date of filing, has the clearest
property rights protection (with little ambiguity), and
is subject to both preliminary and substantive exami-
nation before it can be awarded. Alternatively, a firm
can seek utility model patent protection for its technol-
ogy in China from the SIPO. The utility model patent
cannot be obtained in the United States because the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) does not
issue such patents. Moreover, the utility model patent
in China lasts for 10 years and is generally perceived as
a weaker or less clear form of IPR protection. It is espe-
cially suitable for new technical solutions such as those
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related to a product’s shape, structure, or their com-
bination. No substantive examination is required for
the utility model patent and therefore it is quicker, eas-
ier, and also slightly less expensive to obtain than the
invention patent. However, for the same reason, identi-
cal applications of utility model patents are more likely
to be filed by more than one entity. Therefore, infringe-
ment is more likely to occur in the case of utility model
patents.
Generally, although technologies filed for utility mo-
del patents can differ from those for invention patents,
substantial overlaps in technology between the two
types do exist. In fact, an innovation qualified for
invention patents typically also qualifies for and may
sometimes be filed for utility model patents instead.
Therefore, to a large extent, firms can strategically
decide to file for a utility model or an invention patent.
In anticipation of the accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2001, China adopted theAgree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) in 2001 as part of its WTO obligations,
in which its IPR standards were harmonized with
international rules. The passage of the 2001 patent
law reform provided new judicial protection and
reduced the ambiguity specifically involving utility
model patents, improving its application procedures
and strengthening its enforcement and protection. In
particular, a decision on the patentability of a util-
ity model patent may now be brought to the court
for judicial review, and a search report obtained after
a substantive examination may be required for util-
ity model patents to reduce infringement. Under the
new regime, even though utility model patents are still
easier, somewhat less expensive to obtain, and not as
strong in terms of the duration of protection as the
invention patents, their property rights, enforcement,
and review procedures have been substantially clari-
fied and strengthened (e.g., Stembridge 2010).
2.2. Informal Institutions in China and
IPR Protection
As formal institutions in China tend to be weak and
inefficient, Chinese firms rely more on informal norm-
based approaches and guanxi to take advantage of
their deep embeddedness in China’s informal institu-
tions (Batjargal et al. 2013, Holmes et al. 2013, Webb
et al. 2009). This is exacerbated by the uncertainties in
the change of formal institutions during China’s major
transition to a market-orientated economy, which force
managers to seek solutions in informal institutions
(Peng 2003, Peng and Luo 2000, Xin and Pearce 1996).
In particular, the Chinese market is characterized by
complex interdependence among multiple weak insti-
tutional forces. When there is a confluence of multi-
ple weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal
et al. 2013, Ostrom 2005), the institutions for rule mak-
ing and enforcement become diffused, difficult to iden-
tify, and sometimes contradictory (Batjargal et al. 2013,
Seo and Creed 2002). This reduces the effectiveness
of any formal institution. Furthermore, rather than
the formal rule of law (or fazhi; North 1990), Chinese
society has long been accustomed to the norm of the
“rule of man” (or renzhi; e.g., Backman 1999), which
emphasizes respect for authority and informal net-
works, guanxi, in governing the harmonious relation-
ship between society members who value avoidance
of open conflict (e.g., Chai and Rhee 2009, Xiao and
Tsui 2007). Together, the inefficiency in formal institu-
tions and cultural norm for conflict avoidance enhance
the firm’s reliance on informal institutions to better
navigate in complex environments (e.g., Batjargal et al.
2013). As a result, there is an increased need for infor-
mal coordination among institutions, typically through
authorities or informal networks.
In general, firms can benefit from being embed-
ded in informal institutions through their relation-
ships with exchange partners or other social actors
(e.g., Granovetter 1985) and connections to public offi-
cials (Evans 1996a, b). These informal networks sup-
port how the informal rules, norms, cultural frames,
and practices are shared and persist (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983, Scott 1995). Firms’ embedded relation-
ships in such informal institutions regulate the expec-
tations and behaviors of exchange partners in the social
structure through trust building, fine-grained informa-
tion exchange, and joint problem solving (Granovetter
1985, Uzzi 1996). Prior studies have found in differ-
ent contexts that greater institutional embeddedness
heightens empathy (Batson 1990), improves solutions
to coordination problems among networked partners
(Bazerman and Neale 1992), or prevents opportunis-
tic behaviors of firms as a governance mechanism
(e.g., Gulati 1995). Moreover, strengthening connec-
tions with public officials enables firms to trespass
the public (state)–private boundary for better public–
private cooperation and access to and accumulation
of valuable social capital (Evans 1996a, b). Through
such connections, firms gain better access to knowl-
edge about how to get things done in state agencies
and can better resolve issues jointly with state agencies.
This knowledge enables firms to navigate bureaucratic
agencies, understand their actions, enhance shared
goals and interests, and increase trust with the bureau-
crats (Tsai 2007, Wank 1999, Yang 2005).
In the context of China, firmsmay benefit from infor-
mal norm-based approaches, connections, or guanxi
primarily in two ways. First, informal norms and
guanxi improve firm’s access to bureaucratic officials
for critical resources (Ayyagari et al. 2010, Xin and
Pearce 1996) or to reduce institutional uncertainties
in norm-based bureaucratic interventions (Batjargal
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2010, Batjargal et al. 2013). For example, Chinese firms
have leveraged informal guanxi networks to help per-
suade bureaucrats to lighten the regulatory load, pro-
vide relief from taxation and fees, ease the acquisition
of resources such as bank loans and land-use rights
controlled by the state, and enhance legal oversight to
avert predatory behavior (Chen and Dickson 2010, Lin
2001, Nee and Opper 2010). Second, in a society that
values adherence to social norms (Chen 1995, Earley
and Gibson 1998, Xiao and Tsui 2007), informal ties
among Chinese firms may also serve as deterrents to
deviating behaviors (e.g., Chai and Rhee 2009).
Particularly for the protection of IPR in China, prior
to the establishment of the Chinese patent system in
the mid-1980s, the concept of IPR was largely unrec-
ognized and there was a lack of formal protection of
intellectual assets in China. Even after the mid-1980s,
formal IPR protection is still very inefficient, and there
is significant interdependence among different insti-
tutions with diverse and sometimes conflicting goals
and functions in the protection of intellectual assets.
In China, an IPR infringement can often be resolved
through either a judicial approach (e.g., lawsuit in
court) or a bureaucratic approach (e.g., norm-based
conflict settlement in different levels of governments).
During China’s transition from a planned to market-
based economy, as judicial enforcement is relatively
weak and ineffective, central and provincial govern-
ments play a substantial role in overseeing the oper-
ation of markets and the interaction among firms;
therefore, government interference in firms is largely
a norm and is expected by firms in China (Nee 1989).
Similarly, bureaucratic or administrative authorities (or
xingzheng) in China often have substantive power in
dealing with infringement on IPR among firms (Liu
1994). Moreover, since China’s bureaucratic system
is rather complex with different interdependent hier-
archical levels, multiple bureaucratic units are often
involved in resolving IPR-related conflicts. Firms’ infor-
mal connections to government officials can facilitate
bureaucratic arbitration through negotiation, media-
tion, and resolution of IPR conflicts among disputing
firms outside the courts without undertaking formal
litigation procedures.
Personal and informal connections to the gov-
ernment can, therefore, be useful in resolving IPR
infringement through greater insider information and
enhanced coordination among multiple bureaucratic
units (e.g., Tsai 2007, Wank 1999, Yang 2005). The
presence of multiple complex, interdependent depart-
ments and administrations necessitates and fosters
greater embeddedness of Chinese firms in China’s
informal institutions and hence provides more room
for firms to seek norm-based, nonstandard bureau-
cratic approaches and informal networks to coordinate
among these interdependent agencies. These practices
provide more leeway for firms to utilize personal or
political guanxi and social norm-based approaches to
influence the outcome of the conflict resolution (e.g.,
Ang and Jia 2014). Despite a gradual improvement
in the formal legal system, these informal approaches
have remained popular in China (Tang 2009).
The following example of a patent infringement
case illustrates the above point and reflects a common
phenomenon in China. The main infringed patent is
named Diesel Engine Manual Free Starter (SIPO util-
ity model patent CN2828351), which was applied for
in 2005 and granted in 2006 to a firm in Xinxiang city,
Henan province (SIPO 2008a). Upon detailed review
and investigation, the city government’s IPR official
discovered that many companies had already obtained
sizable manufacturing scale by exploiting and infring-
ing upon the patent. Under such circumstance, advanc-
ing the inventing firm’s interest by implementing the
patent law strictly could lead to the potential closure
of these infringing companies and dismissal of thou-
sands of employees. Instead of using formal litigation
through courts, the firm engaged the help of the Xinxi-
ang city government through its informal connections.
The bureaucratic units of government considered the
economic implications and the diverse goals of inter-
dependent agencies. In consultation with the firm, the
city government’s IPR official adopted a norm-based
approach and worked with the firm to coordinate
and liaise with different city- and county-level depart-
ments and administrations such as the local patent
office, police department, administration of industry
and commerce, and bureau of small and medium
enterprises to resolve the infringement issue. The non-
standard solution adoptedwas the formation of a coali-
tion chaired by the inventor and founder of the firm
to allow usage by other companies while sharing tech-
nical and marketing resources and codeveloping the
technological product. While no formal patent litiga-
tion was carried out, the inventor and the firm derived
substantial financial and technological benefits from
these arrangements and practices. The example illus-
trates that compared to judicial enforcement of patent
protection, the norm-based approach is more popular
and flexible, and therefore deemed more feasible and
effective by firms that have access to it.
In sum, because of the traditional lack of effi-
cient and effective formal institutions, many Chinese
firms’ strategies and economic activities have been
well embedded in the Chinese informal institutions
that allow them to advance their private interests
and optimize performance (Meyer and Rowan 1977,
DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Oliver 1991). As a result,
Chinese firms tend to rely more on informal norm-
based approaches instead of formal legal protection of
their intellectual property assets against expropriation.
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2.3. Institutional Embeddedness, IPR Reforms,
and Firms’ Patenting Choices
Here, we investigate how the level of firm embed-
dedness in the (strongly informal) institutional envi-
ronment in China may influence the firms’ patenting
strategies and responses to major changes in the for-
mal IPR institutions. Based on research on institutional
embeddedness of firms, deep embeddedness in the
prechange institutional context may lead to organiza-
tional and structural inertia in adapting to the new
institutions (e.g., Evans 1995, Greenwood and Hinings
1996, Peng 2003). Embeddedness in a particular institu-
tional contextmay lead to the formation of a template or
archetype that shapes the organizational structures and
practice (Greenwood and Hinings 1993). The change
of organizational template in response to institutional
change would be difficult and slow (Greenwood and
Hinings 1996). The better the fit the firms have with
the existing institutional context, the more difficult it
is for them to successfully transform themselves (Peng
2003). Institutional values and norms are anchored in
regular organizational thoughts andpractices, andmay
cause managerial cognitive difficulty in realizing the
necessity of change and how to change (e.g., Kogut and
Zander 2000).Accordingly, greater institutional embed-
dedness gives rise to greater stickiness or inertia for
firms to change. The institutionalized practices, rou-
tines, and structures become an “institutional baggage”
for firms to carry and cause resistance to change (Roth
andKostova 2003; Zucker 1991, p. 105).Moreover, firms
tend to utilize and accentuate their strategies that have
been successful under the old institutional configura-
tion butmay lack the capabilities required to adjust and
fit into the newly changed institutional environment—
suchas a strengtheningof formal institutional regime—
further increasing the cost incurred in adapting to the
new institution (Perez-Batres and Eden 2008). As such,
firms deeply embedded in the existing institutional
environmentmay try tomaintain the statusquo, hoping
to“muddle through” thenew institutionswithminimal
changes (Peng 2003, p. 285).
Furthermore, the level of embeddedness varies
among firms operating in China. The largest differ-
ence can be observed between two groups of firms:
local Chinese firms and Western firms operating in
China. As discussed in the previous section, before the
IPR reform, the confluence of multiple weak formal
institutions led Chinese firms to rely more on infor-
mal institutions for alternative solutions to IPR pro-
tection. Deeply embedded in and familiar with such
informal institutions, Chinese firmsmay still attempt to
leverage their embedded relationships, access valuable
resources, and gain help from bureaucratic agencies
or regulatory authorities for IPR protection and joint
problem solving even in the new IPR regime (Guillen
2000, Uzzi 1996). Moreover, their existing capabilities
that fit well in the informal institutionsmay be less use-
ful or optimal under the new IPR regime that requires
skills and expertise in legislation for IPR-related issues.
As a result, Chinese firms’ reliance on informal institu-
tions remains “sticky,” even as the formal IPR regime
strengthens, making Chinese firms reluctant to change
their patenting strategies.
In contrast to Chinese firms, Western firms are ex-
pected to be more sensitive to the changes in formal
IPR protection. First, they traditionally attach greater
importance to formal rules and regulations in their
home countries (Branstetter et al. 2006, Grossman and
Helpman 1991). Their developed home institutional
environments usually have clearly stipulated rules and
effective enforcement, which reduce the need for them
to rely on informal institutions to protect their intellec-
tual assets from infringement. Furthermore, given the
developed formal institutions in their home countries,
these Western firms have developed and optimized
their skills and expertise in using legislation for IPR
protection (Caeldries 1996). These firms can more eas-
ily adapt to and apply those skills and expertise to their
operations in China under the strengthened formal IPR
regime. Second, as they have developed their orga-
nizational routines to suit the developed institutions
of their home countries, these routines can constrain
them from effectively embedding in and adapting to
the complex and sometimes ambiguous institutional
environment in China, especially before the IPR regime
improvement (e.g., Kostova and Zaheer 1999). Third,
Western firms may be subject to the liability of for-
eignness, which suggests that firms face greater social
and economic (transaction) costs when they operate
in foreign markets (e.g., Kostova and Zaheer 1999,
Mezias 2002, Zaheer 1995, Zaheer and Mosakowski
1997). Given their foreignness, they may lack under-
standing of local norms and resources to access the
informal network and build a long-term relationship
with state bureaucrats and government agencies.
In sum, compared to local Chinese firms, Western
firms are less embedded in the (informal) institutional
environment in China and therefore have less access to
alternative solutions provided by the informal institu-
tions for IPR protection. As such, Western firms rely
more on the development of formal institutions of IPR
protection in China. It follows that when there is a
strengthening of the IPR regime in the host country, we
predict a greater increase in the likelihood of adoption
of patents with improved protection such as the utility
model patent by Western firms than by Chinese firms.
Therefore, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 1. Upon the strengthening of IPR law, the
increase in the likelihood of a utility model patent application
being made for a technology is smaller for Chinese firms than
for Western firms.
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2.4. Variation in Embeddedness Due
to the De Facto Quality Of the IPR
System Across Regions
While the difference across firms in their embed-
dedness in China’s informal institutions is most pro-
nounced between local Chinese firms and Western
firms operating in China, there are additional varia-
tions in such embeddedness. These variations might
lead to further differences in firms’ responses to
changes in formal institutions. We first focus on the
variation in embeddedness due to the different de
facto quality of IPR systems across different regions of
China.
Although China’s formal IPR institutions are quite
weak in general (Huang 2017, Zhao 2006), which rein-
forcedChinese firms’ greater reliance on informal insti-
tutions, different regions in China are not equal in their
degree of development in formal IPR and legal institu-
tions. Since the opening up of China in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, there have been systematic differences
across regions in the development of the legal system
and appreciation of formal laws. As a result, the de
facto quality of the IPR and legal systems across dif-
ferent regions of China varies significantly. For exam-
ple, in some of the inland provinces of China such as
Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, and Yunnan, formal insti-
tutions for IPR protection and enforcement are not very
effective (Fan et al. 2010). The IPR courts and legal sys-
tems in these regions are weak and often influenced
by local administrative agencies. Here, greater insti-
tutional embeddedness can promote commitment and
joint problem solving among firms and local admin-
istrative agencies, and allow Chinese firms to access
the social capital across the state–private divide. This
enhances the successful dealing with inefficient formal
institutions to provide more effective IPR protection.
As a result, firms conducting R&D in these regions
tend to rely more on informal approaches for the pro-
tection of their innovation outputs.
By contrast, the de facto IPR quality is often (but
not always) higher in the coastal provinces such as
Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Shandong, and in certain
Chinese municipalities such as Beĳing, Shanghai, and
Tianjin.2 These regions have traditionally inherited
stronger legal infrastructure and court systems and
a deeper appreciation for the rule of law. They have
developed more robust formal IPR institutions (Du
et al. 2008, World Bank 2008). In these regions, if firms
rely primarily on embedded ties in informal institu-
tions, they could be insulated from the more effec-
tive market mechanisms and possibilities, hindering
firm performance (Uzzi 1997). Furthermore, compared
with those in the inland provinces, the IP courts in
the municipalities are more separated from and thus
less influenced by local administrative agencies. There-
fore, the ambiguity of interaction between institutions
decreases and the IP courts are more responsive and
effective in IPR litigation and enforcement to protect
the intellectual property assets of foreign and domestic
firms. These better developed formal institutions help
to reduce Chinese firms’ reliance on informal norm-
based approaches to protect their R&D outputs and
innovations.
Given firms’ various strategic considerations, their
R&D activities are distributed across different regions
in China. Throughout the stages of the R&D process,
firms continuously file patents to protect their innova-
tions, typically in the same locations where the firms
conduct their R&D (Fan et al. 2011, Wang et al. 2007).3
Moreover, firms that conduct R&D in the same region
not only share the same formal legal institutions, but
also a similar informal institutional environment, such
as common “codes” of communication, conventions,
and norms. The informal institutional environment
affects Chinese firms much more than Western firms
given Chinese firms’ embeddedness in and greater
reliance on local informal institutions. Such tacit knowl-
edge and understanding resulting from the confluence
of formal and informal institutions are heavily imbued
with meaning arising from the social and institutional
contexts inwhich that confluence is produced. They are
difficult to transmit over long distances and, hence, spa-
tially sticky (Gertler 2003).
As such, although China has weak IPR institutions
in general, and thus Chinese firms are overall more
embedded in China’s informal institutions, some Chi-
nese regions historically developed higher de facto
IPR quality than others. Firms that conduct R&D in
those different regions may vary in their embedded-
ness in informal institutions. Chinese firms operat-
ing in regions with high de facto IPR quality are less
embedded in China’s informal institutions. They are
thus expected to be more responsive to the IPR regime
shift, a behavior that departs from other Chinese firms
operating in regions with low IPR quality but one that
comes closer to their Western counterparts. As a result,
these Chinese firms are more likely to respond to a
formal IPR regime shift and thus exhibit a smaller dif-
ference from their Western counterparts.
Hypothesis 2. Upon the strengthening of IPR law, the dif-
ference in the likelihood of utility model patent applications
being made by Chinese firms and by Western firms for tech-
nologies is smaller for technologies developed in regions with
higher de facto IPR quality.
2.5. Variation in Embeddedness Due to
Western Firms’ Experience in China
In this section, we examine the variation within West-
ern firms in their embeddedness in China’s informal
institutions as a result of their differential opera-
tional experience in China, even though they are, on
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average, less embedded compared to their Chinese
counterparts.
Because Western multinational firms entered the
Chinese market at different periods in time, the dif-
ference in their operational experiences in China may
influence howmuch they have understood and learned
about China’s informal institutions, norms, and prac-
tices. Earlier entrants typically enjoy greater learning
experiences, enabling them to better understand their
Chinese counterparts, domestic markets, governments,
and business community (Pan and Chi 1999). While
Chinese cultural/philosophical traditions cannot be
easily transplanted to Western firms, Western firms
may be able to learn and potentially assimilate infor-
mal norms and practices over time through constant
exposure to informal institutions and practices by their
Chinese counterparts. Earlier Western entrants also
have more time to cultivate relationships and guanxi
with their key stakeholders (Kogut and Zander 1993).
These efforts allow earlier Western entrants to better
embed in and take advantage of China’s strong infor-
mal institutions.
Many foreign firms in China have undergone a sub-
stantial transition from “foreign investors” to “strate-
gic insiders” (Luo 2007). The shifting competitive and
regulatory environment for the past three decades has
made China’s market immensely competitive, requir-
ing foreign firms to effectively integrate and embed
into the domestic market. Moreover, over the years,
China’s overall regulatory framework has been head-
ing toward a similar treatment of foreign and local
firms and more regulatory power by regional govern-
ments. Among several implications of this transition
(Luo 2007, p. 19), foreign firms find it critical to
adapt to local convention and practices, as well as to
enhance cooperation with the host country govern-
ment and business community. These foreign firms
are rewarded for conforming to the host-country
institutional environment as institutions create pres-
sures for the adoption of social patterns and norms
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Kostova and Zaheer 1999).
This requires foreign firms to appreciate and improve
adherence to China’s social norms and practices (e.g.,
Strutton and Pelton 1997). Localization to the domestic
knowledge pool and cultivation of an interorganiza-
tional relationship with the domestic business commu-
nity are also important for foreign firms to develop
innovative competence (Almeida and Phene 2004).
However, such adaptation takes time, especially
given that the change in China’s market and regula-
tory environment was gradual but substantial. Thus,
earlier foreign entrants have had more learning oppor-
tunities to understand informal institutions and their
interaction with formal institutions (Kogut and Zander
1993, Pan and Chi 1999). They are more likely to have
accumulated experiences dealing with IPR issues and
have understood the effectiveness of different informal
alternatives. They could also have had more opportu-
nities to build social networks with the local govern-
ment and the business community, facilitating greater
access to informal institutions (Granovetter 1985, Uzzi
1996). Thus, we postulate that the longer a Western
firm operates in China, the more likely the firm and
its strategies have been embedded in and adapted to
China’s informal institutional norms and practices. The
Western firmmay behavemore like a domestic Chinese
firm in resolving IPR-related conflicts.
Hypothesis 3. Upon the strengthening of IPR law, the dif-
ference in the likelihood of utility model patent applications
being made by Chinese firms and by Western firms for tech-
nologies is smaller for Western firms with longer operational
experience in China.
3. Methods
3.1. Empirical Context and Approach
Although China is the largest emerging economy
in the world, it has a relatively young IPR system,
which started in 1985, and, in general, a weak for-
mal IPR environment (Huang 2017, Zhao 2006). Com-
pared with developed Western countries that have
long-established, clear, and strong formal IPR regimes,
emerging economies such as China suffer from institu-
tional inadequacies (Ginarte and Park 1997). To bring
its patent law closer to the WTO requirements and
to further harmonize its patent law and IPR stan-
dards with international rules such as the TRIPS
agreement—which China adopted in 2001 as part of its
WTO obligations in its accession to the WTO—China
has undertaken substantial efforts in recent years to
strengthen and harmonize its IPR legal framework
through major IPR reform, such as the 2001 patent law
amendment. This particular top-down reform in IPR
law, designed and implemented by the central gov-
ernment, was influenced by the exogenous change in
China’s national policy to align with WTO standards
and the TRIPS agreement. Although accompanying
China’s accession to the WTO might have been some
general expectation that more changes in IP regime
would take place over time, this particular IP reform
and its details were not disclosed until the announce-
ment on August 25, 2000 (which came into effect on
July 1, 2001), and hence were relatively unexpected.
Table 1 summarizes the 2001 China patent law amend-
ment. Such an exogenous event allows us to better
isolate the impact of strengthening and clarifying the
formal IPR regime, especially for the previously weak
form of IPR protection (i.e., utility model patents), on
Chinese andWestern firms’ strategic patenting choices
and provides a suitable setting for testing our theoreti-
cal predictions.
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Table 1. Summary of the 2001 China Patent Law Amendment
2001 China Patent Law Amendment
Adopted and announced at the 17th Session of the Standing Committee of the 9th National
People’s Congress on August 25, 2000, and effective on July 1, 2001; top-down reform
Objective To promote the development and innovation of science and
technology
Motivation Membership into World Trade Organization
Patent law fully in line with TRIPS agreement
Enhance innovations from Chinese/domestic technology firms
Changes implemented
Examination/review More efficient examination and approval procedures
Patentability of a utility model patent subject to judicial review
Search report for utility model that can be obtained after substantive
examination may be required
Patent scope Right to patent goes to employer if employee uses materials and
resources of the employer to make invention
Assignee right Exclusive right of “offering for sale” extended to assignee
More severe punishment for violation of existing patent right
Stricter licensing procedures
Use or sale of patented product without knowing that it was
patented now considered infringement
Source. SIPO (2000).
Our study focuses on comparing Chinese and
Western firms’ shifts in patenting strategies on tech-
nologies of international importance. Such technolo-
gies should be developed in China, and also be of
strategic importance in the face of global competition.
Moreover, they should provide a common platform
for comparing the patenting behaviors of Western and
Chinese firms in China. To do this, we hand collected
and constructed a data set of the entire population
of patents applied for by and awarded to Chinese
and/orWestern firms for the same inventions in China
and in the United States from the years 1985 to 2008.
We chose the United States because it is the largest
and the most technologically sophisticated market in
the world and is the leading choice of country in
which to obtain a patent for firms with technologies
of international interest and importance. This sample
captures all China-originated technologies for which
patents were applied for in China and the United States
(through SIPO and USPTO, respectively) and subse-
quently granted in both countries.
Our final sample consists of 1,070 patents granted
both in China and in the United States to 430 unique
Chinese and Western firms that operate and conduct
R&D in China.4 The SIPO patents were applied for by
these firms from 1985 to 2006 and granted from 1986 to
2007; the USPTO patent counterparts were applied for
from 1985 and 2007 and granted from 1987 and 2008.
A SIPO patent can be precisely linked to its USPTO
patent counterpart using the priority right information
identified in the USPTO patent if it is a transnational
China–U.S. patent dyad covering the same invention
filed both in China and the United States. A priority
right (or right of priority) is a time-limited right trig-
gered by the first filing of an application for a patent
(i.e., the origin of a technological invention). The prior-
ity right belongs to the applicant or to his or her suc-
cessor in title and allows him or her to file a subsequent
patent application in another country for the same
invention. For this subsequent application, the appli-
cant can then benefit from the date of filing of the
first application for the examination of certain require-
ments by the appropriate patent offices.5 When filing
a subsequent application, the applicant must legally
claim the priority of the first application to make use of
the priority right. Thus, priority right information in a
patent can be used to precisely link a Chinese patent to
its U.S. counterpart. The priority right for patents usu-
ally lasts 12 months. The timeline in Figure 1 illustrates
the relationship between a typical Chinese patent and
its U.S. counterpart.
Furthermore, this research design and data set yield
the following advantages. First, they allow us to screen
out inventions of lower quality (e.g., “junk” patents)
by focusing on inventions that pass the patentability
bar of novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness of both
the SIPO and USPTO.6 These inventions developed in
China are also important enough to the firms to be
patented in theUnited States, the largest andmost tech-
nologically sophisticated market in the world. Consis-
tent with previous studies (Jaffe et al. 1993, Murray
and Stern 2007), we account for the quality of these
inventions by controlling for the cumulative forward
citations to the matched USPTO patent, as citations to
SIPO patents are not mandatory and could be absent.
Second, as the USPTO awards only invention
patents, whereas the SIPO awards both invention and
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Figure 1. Relationship of a Typical Chinese Patent and Its U.S. Patent Counterpart and Follow-on U.S. Patent Citations
Application of China patent
(together with or before the
application of the associated
U.S. patent)
Enforcement of China
patent (usually follows
after the granting of
China patent)
Application of focal U.S.
patent (typically within 12 months
after China patent application)
Grant of China patent (average of
about 3 years after the application
of the China patent)
Follow-on U.S. patents application (citing focal U.S. patent application)
utility model patents, and each SIPO patent in our data
set is precisely linked to a USPTO patent covering the
same invention, we observe a natural variation in terms
of the firms’ patenting choices in China. Unlike firms
in the United States, firms in China can strategically
choose to file for either of the two types of patents,
even when the technology is of sufficient merit and
importance to the firm for it to be filed in the United
States and granted a USPTO invention patent.7 This
natural variation, together with controls for the legal
strength, scope, quality (or value), and technology sec-
tor of the patents, helpsmitigate the concern that a util-
ity model patent is simply filed because the associated
technology is inferior.8 Thus, our focus at the patent
level enables a richer and more nuanced observation
of and control for the above-mentioned characteris-
tics of each patented technology. As well, this setup
allows us to control for firm attributes at the aggre-
gated firm level. The larger number of observations at
the patent level also provides greater statistical power
to our empirical tests.
3.2. Data Sources
We drew our data from the following five different
sources: (1) Data on the U.S. patents, citations, and
patent characteristics are derived from the USPTO.
(2) Data on the Chinese patents, citations, and patent
characteristics are obtained from the SIPO. (3) Data on
IPRqualityandlegalprotectionofeachof the31Chinese
provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions are
assessed using the relevant indices developed by the
National Economic Research Institute (NERI) of China,
asdescribedinits2011report (Fanetal.2011).9Although
this information is only available from the year 1997
onward, it is reasonably stable and consistent over
time across provincial-level regions in China, as vali-
dated by prior studies (Li and Qian 2013, Wang and
Qian 2011). (4) Data on firms’ operational experience
in China and years since founding are manually col-
lected from official firm websites and firms’ annual
reports. (5) Data on whether the firm is publicly listed
are obtained from Compustat Global Data, supple-
mented by information from official firm websites and
annual reports.
3.3. Measures
3.3.1. Dependent Variable. Our dependent variable
is captured by an indicator variable that indicates
whether a patent is filed as a utility model patent. It is
set to 1 if the firm applies for the utility model patent
for a particular technology (and 0 if the firm applies
for an invention patent). This is our variable of inter-
est as with the increase in firms’ adoption of utility
model patents, relative to the invention patent, there is
a greater likelihood the variable takes on the value 1.
The increase in the adoption of utility model patents
could arise from either a shift from those technolo-
gies that might otherwise have been filed as invention
patents, or from those technologies that might other-
wise not have been filed for any patents previously.10
3.3.2. Independent Variables. Our key explanatory
variable is IPR change in force. It is an indicator variable
that equals 1 for all years since the implementation of
themajor China IPR law change in 2001, and 0 for years
prior to the change. Chinese firm denotes whether the
firm awarded the patent originates from or is home
based in China. Western firm denotes whether the firm
awarded the patent originates from or is home based
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in a Western country.11 We use either the Chinese firm
or Western firm indicator variable in different models,
based on what is required to best test the hypothe-
ses. For example, we use the interaction term between
IPR change in force and Chinese firm to test the differen-
tial impact of IPR law change on Chinese and Western
firms, as suggested by Hypothesis 1.
De facto IPR quality is captured by the average of the
number of patent applications and granted patents (for
all firms and organizations) divided by the number
of R&D or technical personnel in each provincial-level
region in China (Fan et al. 2011). Consistent with prior
studies (e.g., Fan et al. 2010), this provides a reason-
able proxy for the level of IPR protection in each region
as it indicates the patenting productivity and incen-
tive of scientific and technical personnel in each region,
which are closely associated with stronger IPR protec-
tion (e.g., Nordhaus 1969). As an alternative measure
of the quality of the IPR legal system, we construct the
variable de facto legal protection. This variable uses one
of the NERI indices computed from surveys to firms
and other corporate entities on the effectiveness of legal
enforcement and fairness of legal administrations in
each provincial-level region for the protection of firms
and their assets.12 Following previous studies (Zhao
2006), a patented technology is considered to be devel-
oped in a particular region when 50% or more of the
inventors in the patent are based in the region. As dis-
cussed before, regions with high de facto IPR quality are
sometimes (but not always) coastal provinces or major
municipalities in China with traditionally greater pres-
ence of Western firms and their R&D facilities. We
interact de facto IPR quality (or, as an alternative mea-
sure, de facto legal protection) with IPR change in force and
Chinese firm to test the effect of variation in de facto IPR
quality across different regions in China, as suggested
by Hypothesis 2.
Operational experience in China is defined as the num-
ber of years the firm assigned to a particular tech-
nology patent has had formal operational facilities in
China until the year of observation (i.e., patent appli-
cation year). We use the natural log of the number of
years plus one in our analyses to capture the nonlin-
ear effect associated with operational experience as the
marginal learning effect may decrease as experience
grows (e.g., Argote and Epple 1990). We use the inter-
action among operational experience in China, IPR change
in force, and Western firm to test the effect of variation
in Western firms’ experience in China, as Hypothesis 3
suggests.
3.3.3. Control Variables. We include the following
patent-level controls. Law announcement window is an
indicator variable that equals 1 during the period
between 2000when the IPR law changewas announced
(on August 25) and 2001 when the law is imple-
mented (on July 1). This variable helps us to account for
the noise associated with this particular period from
law announcement to actual implementation. Number
of claims denotes the number of legal claims made
by a U.S. patent, which provides a proxy for patent
legal strength (Harhoff and Reitzig 2004, Lanjouw and
Schankerman 2001).Number of classes denotes the num-
ber of patent technology classes in the U.S. patent
that provides a proxy for patent scope (Lerner 1994,
Scotchmer 1991). Cumulative citations captures the total
number of forward citations received by a particular
patent until 2008. This variable provides an additional
control for the quality or value of the patented technol-
ogy (Furman and Stern 2011, Jaffe et al. 1993, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg 2002).13
Furthermore, we include a set of technology sector con-
trols. Based on a large body of literature (Cohen et al.
2000, Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Huang 2010, Levin et al.
1987), is the set consists of six indicator variables each
denoting whether a patent belongs to a discrete tech-
nology sector (i.e., pharmaceutical or chemical) or to a
complex technology sector (i.e., computing, semicon-
ductor, information technology, or communications).
Firms can adopt different patenting strategies for tech-
nologies in different sectors. Patents in discrete tech-
nology sectors may have higher substantive value for
product development and protection against expro-
priation (Huang and Murray 2010, Huang and Ertug
2014, von Graevenitz et al. 2011). Patents in complex
technology sectors may have higher strategic value as
cross-licensing bargaining chips and for establishing
IPR territories (Hall and Ziedonis 2001).
We also include the following firm-level controls.
Private firm is an indicator variable that is coded 1when
the firm is not publicly listed, that is, has not gone
through initial public offering, and coded 0 when the
firm is publicly listed. Years since founding is defined
as the number of years the firm assigned to a partic-
ular patented technology has been founded, whether
in China or in a Western country, until the year of
observation (i.e., patent application year). Similarly, we
use the natural log of the number of years plus one in
our analyses to capture the nonlinear effect of learn-
ing associated with this variable. The performance of
private firms differs from that of public ones under
resource constraints (George 2005). Firms that are pri-
vate or young could also be more entrepreneurial
(Agarwal et al. 2009). Thus, they may exhibit different,
perhaps more aggressive, innovation and patenting
strategies compared with older and more established
public firms. Following prior studies (e.g., Jaffe et al.
1993, Murray and Stern 2007), we also include lifetime
patents, which is the total number of patents awarded
by the USPTO until 2008 to each firm, to control for the
level of innovative capability of the firm especially for
technologies of international importance. In the most
stringent models, instead of these firm-level controls,
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we include firm fixed effects to control for any firm-level
unobserved heterogeneity in patenting behavior and
preferences. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and
correlations of these variables.
3.4. Regression Model
As the dependent variable is a dichotomous outcome
variable that indicates whether a patent is filed as a
utility model patent (i.e., taking on the value of either
1 or 0) while there is no restriction on the values of the
independent variables, a logistic regression (or logit
model) would be suitable to model their relationship
(Long 1997, Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). The ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) regression model may result
in invalid standard errors and hypothesis tests because
the errors (i.e., residuals) from the OLS model may
violate the assumptions of homoscedasticity and nor-
mality of errors of the OLS regression (Long 1997,
pp. 38–40). In the logit model, the log odds of the out-
come variable are modeled as a linear combination
of the predictor variables. In our most stringent logit
models, we include firm fixed effects and technology
sector fixed effects to control for the potentially unob-
served underlying heterogeneity among firms and
technology sectors. The fixed effects specification is
supported by the result of a Hausman test.
4. Results
Models 3-1 to 3-4 in Table 3 present the results of
the fixed effects logistic regression models with the
dichotomous dependent variable utility model patent.
We also incorporate robust standard errors in all the
models based onWooldridge (1999) to account for pos-
sible heteroscedasticity and lack of normality in the
error terms. Model 3-1 shows the baseline specification
with the patent-level, technology sector,14 and firm-
level controls for all observations between 1985 and
2008. Model 3-2 includes the key independent vari-
able, IPR change in force, but excludes any interaction
terms. When IPR regime strengthens after 2000 (IPR
change in force 1), the odds of obtaining a utility model
patent significantly increase by a factor of 4.48 (equal to
exp(1.50), p < 0.001) on average for both Chinese firms
and Western firms.
Models 3-3 and 3-4 test the differential responses of
Chinese relative to Western firms in the odds of utility
model patenting after the IPR improvement as pre-
dicted by Hypothesis 1. Model 3-3 includes the inter-
action between IPR change in force and Chinese firm
together with all the controls but excluding firm fixed
effects. Results suggest that IPR regime strengthen-
ing increases the odds of choosing the utility model
patent for Western firms by a factor of 10.38 (equal to
exp(2.34), p < 0.001), but only by a factor of 3.29 (equal
to exp(2.34− 1.15), p < 0.001) for Chinese firms. In the
most stringent (and our preferred) main model 3–4, Ta
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Models on the Effects of IPR Law Reform
Model 3-2 Model 3-3 Model 3-4
Model 3-1 Model without Model with Main model
Model with interaction and interaction but with interaction
Variables controls only without firm FEs without firm FEs and firm FEs
Law announcement window −0.87∗∗∗ −0.91∗∗∗ −5.05∗∗∗
[0.25] [0.24] [1.17]
IPR change in force 1.50∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗ 4.68∗∗
[0.24] [0.47] [1.74]
Chinese firm 0.16 −0.29 0.35 −3.87∗
[0.24] [0.25] [0.42] [1.50]
Number of claims 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.04
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04]
Number of classes −0.05 −0.05 −0.04 0.05
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.06]
Cumulative citations −0.11∗∗∗ −0.05+ −0.05+ −0.06
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.07]
Private firm 2.00∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗
[0.46] [0.47] [0.47]
Years since founding 0.21∗∗ 0.05 0.07
[0.07] [0.08] [0.08]
Lifetime patents −0.00∗ −0.00∗ −0.00∗
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
IPR change in force×Chinese firm −1.15∗ −5.37∗∗
[0.54] [1.99]
Technology sector controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects (FEs) Yes
Constant −2.05∗∗∗ −1.74∗∗ −2.28∗∗∗ 8.61∗∗∗
[0.54] [0.54] [0.62] [1.96]
Observations 1,070 1,070 1,070 342
Pseudo-R-squared 0.24 0.30 0.31 0.75
Log-likelihood −428.18 −391.56 −388.85 −58.06
Note. Robust standard errors are in brackets. All tests are two-tailed.
+p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
which includes patent-level and technology sector con-
trols and firm fixed effects, the difference is even larger;
that is, IPR change in force has a positive effect on West-
ern firms’ adoption by a factor of 108 (p < 0.01) com-
pared to no significant increase in Chinese firms (i.e.,
nonsignificant combined effect). Put differently, the
marginal probability of Chinese firms adopting utility
model patenting after the strengthening of the IPR law
is 0.41 (p < 0.001), which is not significantly different
from the probability before the law change. By con-
trast, the marginal probability of Western firms adopt-
ing utility model patenting increases to 0.89 (p < 0.001)
after the IPR law strengthening from 0.64 (p < 0.001)
before the law change. Taken together, these results
support Hypothesis 1.
We explore whether the effects of the patent law
strengthening might have started even before the
announcement of the law change and whether such
effect takes time to manifest itself after the law change.
To do this, we estimate a logistic regression model
including all controls and separate indicator variables
for each of the three years preceding and following the
law change, when the effects might have been most
salient. Figure 2 shows the coefficients, reported as
odds ratios, from this specification. Whereas a decline
Figure 2. (Color online) Impact of Patent Law Strengthening
(Announced in August 2000 and Implemented in July 2001)
on the Choice of Utility Model Patenting by Chinese and
Western Firms
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for Western firms is observed in the year before the
law change, a sharp and continued increase is observed
over the three years since the change. There seems to
be little or no effect on Chinese firms before the change,
and only a slight overall increase over the three years
since the change.
Table 4 shows models 4-1 to 4-3, which include all
patent-level and technology sector controls, as well as
firm fixed effects based on the specifications of the
(preferred) main model 3-4. Models 4-1 and 4-2 report
the results of the testing of Hypothesis 2 by respec-
tively estimating the effects of variations of de facto IPR
quality and de facto legal protection across different
regions in China. In model 4-1, we include all the two-
way and three-way interactions among Chinese firms,
IPR change in force, and de facto IPR quality. The coef-
ficient of IPR change in force × Chinese firm is negative
and significant (−306, p < 0.001), which again suggests
a smaller increase for Chinese firms in utility model
patenting than Western firms. However, the positive
and significant coefficient (25, p < 0.001) of the inter-
action, IPR change in force × Chinese firm × de facto IPR
quality, indicates the difference between Chinese and
Western firms will decrease if the quality of regional
IPR system increases.
Model 4-2 includes all two-way interactions and
three-way interactions among Chinese firms, IPR change
in force, and the alternative measure, de facto legal pro-
tection. Similar to model 4-1, the coefficient for IPR
change in force × Chinese firm in model 4-2 is nega-
tive and significant (−236, p < 0.001). However, the
positive and significant coefficient (45, p < 0.001) of
the three-way interaction, IPR change in force × Chinese
firm × de facto legal protection, indicates that such dif-
ference between Chinese and Western firms will simi-
larly decrease if the regional legal protection increases.
Taken together, these results suggest that the difference
between Chinese and Western firms’ patenting strate-
gies becomes less pronouncedwhen they develop their
technologies in regions of higher de facto IPR quality or
stronger de facto legal protection. Therefore, Hypothe-
sis 2 is supported.
Model 4-3 reports the results of the testing of
Hypothesis 3 by estimating the effects of firms’ oper-
ational experience in China. As our theoretical focus
here is on the variation in the change in patenting strat-
egy among Western firms (relative to Chinese firm) as
their operational experience in China increases, we use
Chinese firm as the basis for comparison in this regres-
sionmodel. The nonsignificant coefficient of IPR change
in force in model 4-3 suggests that Chinese firms (when
Western firm 0) show no apparent change in the odds
of utility model patent after the IPR shift. The significant
and positive coefficient of IPR change in force×Western
firm (105, p < 0.05) suggests thatWestern firms substan-
tially increase the odds of utility model patent after the
IPR regime change. However, the negative and signif-
icant coefficient (−41, p < 0.05) of the three-way inter-
action, IPR change in force ×Western firm × operational
experience in China, suggests that such odds difference
will decrease as the operational experience of West-
ern firms increases. This suggests that Western firms
behave more like their Chinese counterparts as they
operate longer in China’s informal institutional envi-
ronment. In other words, the difference between Chi-
nese and Western firms in their changes in patenting
strategy after IPR regime shift is smaller for West-
ern firms with longer operational experience in China.
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
4.1. Supplemental Analyses on Institutional
Embeddedness and Stickiness of Firm
Responses
To supplement the empirical analyses conducted for
Hypotheses 1 to 3, we performed the following two
additional analyses by using more fine-grained mea-
sures of institutional distances to differentiate Western
firms originating from different countries. In partic-
ular, instead of putting all Western firms together,
we employed formal institutional (legal) distance and
informal institutional (cultural) distance, respectively,
as two additional proxies for the degree of institutional
embeddedness.
For the first test, following our theoretical logic,
we argue that firms from countries with stronger for-
mal institutions (i.e., further institutional distance from
China) tend to be less embedded in China’s (infor-
mal) institutions and hence less sticky in their response
to the strengthening of the IPR regime in China. So,
we investigated the effects of institutional distances
between firms from China and those from different
Western countries on their responses to the strengthen-
ing of the IPR regime. We follow prior studies on insti-
tutional distances between countries (e.g., Gaur and Lu
2007, Gu and Lu 2011) and adopt their measures of
country-level institutional indicators in terms of legal
institutional environments, obtained from the World
Bank’s Governance Indicators (Gu and Lu 2011). The
legal institutional environment consists of indicators
on political stability, rule of law, voice and accountabil-
ity, control and corruption, government effectiveness,
and regulatory quality.
To conduct this analysis, we first define and code the
continuous variable legal distance from China as the dif-
ference in the absolute value of the legal environment
factor score of each country from that of China (which
has the lowest score among the countries in our sam-
ple). Given that the legal environment factor score is
relatively stable over time, we follow prior studies and
take the yearly average for each country (Gu and Lu
2011).We then perform an analysis similar tomodel 3-4
but substituteChinese firmwith legal distance from China,
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Table 4. Fixed Effects Logistic Regression Models on the Effects of IPR Quality and Operational Experience
Model 4-2 Model 4-3
Model 4-1 Alternative measure: Operational
De facto (regional) De facto (regional) experience
Variables IPR quality legal protection in China
Law announcement window −12.50∗∗∗ −8.63∗∗∗ −59.27∗∗
[1.43] [2.46] [20.35]
IPR change in force 305.50∗∗∗ 239.34∗∗∗ 0.45
[3.11] [20.76] [3.27]
Number of claims −0.02 −0.04 −0.03
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Number of classes −0.02 −0.03 −0.02
[0.09] [0.11] [0.06]
Cumulative citations −0.06 −0.06 −0.07
[0.07] [0.08] [0.07]
Chinese firm 118.22∗∗∗ 0.99
[23.32] [9.36]
IPR change in force×Chinese firm −305.52∗∗∗ −235.61∗∗∗
[3.11] [20.33]
De facto IPR quality 8.47∗∗∗
[1.82]
IPR change in force×De facto IPR quality −25.44∗∗∗
[3.68]
Chinese firm×De facto IPR quality −8.93∗∗∗
[1.70]
IPR change in force×Chinese firm×De facto IPR quality 25.35∗∗∗
[3.56]
De facto legal protection −1.32
[3.36]
IPR change in force×De facto legal protection −46.52∗∗∗
[4.36]
Chinese firm×De facto legal protection −0.88
[1.85]
IPR change in force×Chinese firm×De facto legal protection 45.47∗∗∗
[4.17]
Western firm −151.64∗∗∗
[35.71]
Operational experience in China −2.22∗∗
[0.80]
IPR change in force×Western firm 105.08∗
[44.51]
IPR change in force×Operational experience in China 0.20
[0.86]
Western firm×Operational experience in China 80.45∗∗∗
[10.92]
IPR change in force×Western firm×Operational experience in China −41.17∗
[16.33]
Technology sector controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant −105.65∗∗∗ 17.14 −55.51∗∗
[26.00] [17.51] [20.76]
Observations 342 342 342
Pseudo-R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.79
Log-likelihood −49.08 −47.87 −48.29
Note. Robust standard errors in brackets. All tests are two-tailed.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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and substitute the interaction term IPR change in force×
Chinese firm with IPR change in force× legal distance from
China. We find the impact of patent regime improve-
ment on firms’ response in terms of utility model
patent application significantly increases with greater
legal distance from China. This finding suggests that
firms from countries relying on stronger formal insti-
tutions (i.e., less embedded in China’s informal insti-
tutions and hence less sticky) exhibit greater and more
positive response to China’s IPR law improvement.
For the second test, we look into the effect of
informal institutions—such as cultural-philosophical
differences—on the differential responses between
Chinese and Western firms to IPR law improvement.
We suggest that firms from countries with closer
informal institutional distance to China tend to share
more common cultural values and informal norms.
Consequently, these firms tend to be more embedded
in informal institutions in China and hence exhibit
more stickiness or resistance in their response to
China’s formal IPR regime strengthening. To opera-
tionalize this test, we code Hofstede’s (2001) measure
of long-term orientation (LTO), also known as “Con-
fucian dynamism,” based on the firms’ country of ori-
gin. Chinese firms’ reliance on informal institutions
and the “rule of man” (as discussed before) could be
partly influenced by traditional culture and philosophy
such as Confucianism, which places more emphasis on
social norms based on a code of conduct instead of for-
mal rules and regulations. Thus, this measure provides
some evidence on the role of cultural–philosophical
differences. Despite the limitations of Hofstede culture
measures (Shenkar 2001), they have been extensively
used in studies on international business (e.g., Tihanyi
et al. 2005) and innovation and entrepreneurship (e.g.,
Shane 1995, Steensma et al. 2000). Particularly, the LTO
dimension can be interpreted as dealing with society’s
search for virtue—the extent towhich a society shows a
pragmatic long-term oriented perspective or approach
that is less confrontational (with higher LTO value)
than a conventional short-term point of view (with
lower LTO value). We argue that firms from countries
with more similar LTO values may have less difficulty
in learning and embedding into the Chinese institu-
tional environment.
Specifically, to conduct this analysis, we define and
code the continuous variable LTO distance from China
as the difference in the absolute value of LTO of a
country from that of China, which has the highest
LTO value of 118 among all the countries based on the
Hofstede (2001) measure. Compared with firms from
Asian countries, firms from the United States and other
Western countries have greater LTO distance from China,
which corresponds to their low values in the LTO
dimension. Given that cultural values are relatively sta-
ble over time (Hofstede 2001), we treat this measure as
time invariant in our analysis. We then employ regres-
sion models similar to model 3-4 but substitute Chinese
firm with LTO distance from China, and substitute the
interaction term between IPR change in force and Chi-
nese firmwith that between IPR change in force and LTO
distance from China. We find that the effect of patent
regime improvement on firms’ response in terms of
utility model patent adoption significantly increases
(decrease) with greater (less) LTO distance from China.
This result shows that firms from countries closer in
LTO distance to China have more similar patenting
behavior to their Chinese counterparts because they
are likely to be more embedded in China’s informal
institution and hence less responsive to China’s formal
IPR regime strengthening.
4.2. Robustness Analyses
We investigated the robustness of our results in several
additional ways (detailed results are available from the
authors). First, we assessed whether our findings are
sensitive to different window periods and IPR regime
change in force periods. To do this, we substituted law
announcement window with alternative window period
controls (e.g., 2000 or 2001) separately in the most
stringent model, model 3-4. The results are robust and
consistent with that of model 3-4. We also used an
alternative IPR regime change in force period (i.e., after
2001) in a regression model similar to model 3–4. The
results are robust and consistent with that reported in
the main model.
Second, we checked whether the implementation
of an earlier Chinese patent law amendment in 1992
affects our results. The 1992 amendment was the first
major reform of the Chinese patent law system and
hence provided some preliminary changes to increase
the enforcement of patent holders’ rights and the scope
of patent protection. Since these preliminary changes
occurred in the early years of China’s patent system
and there are few changes specific to the utility model
patent, it is of less theoretical and empirical interest to
us for the purpose of this study. Nevertheless, control-
ling for it using an indicator variable that equals 1 for
the years from 1993 to 2000 (and 0 otherwise) in mod-
els similar to models 3-3 to 3-4 and models 4-1 to 4-3
yielded consistent and robust results.
Third, to provide additional tests for Hypotheses 2
and 3, we performed split-sample analyses to verify
whether the first-order effects of IPR law change on
the patenting strategies of Chinese and Western firms
depend on the variations in (i) the de facto IPR qual-
ity of the region in which the firms’ technologies are
developed and (ii) the operational experience of West-
ern firms in China. To perform the first analysis, we
first split the patents assigned to Chinese and Western
firms into two subsamples at the median de facto IPR
quality across all the provincial-level regions. Using
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regression analysis similar tomodel 3-4 on the two sub-
samples constructed, we find that, for the subsample of
Chinese firms in regions with lower de facto IPR qual-
ity, the coefficient of the interaction term IPR change
in force × Chinese firm is negative and significant (−38,
p < 0.001). By contrast, the effect is positive and signif-
icant (13, p < 0.001) for the subsample of Chinese firms
in regions with higher de facto IPR quality. The differ-
ence between the two coefficients is significant, lending
further support to Hypothesis 2.
To perform the second analysis, we first split the
patents assigned to Western firms into two subgroups
at the median operational experience in China. Each of
the subgroups is then combined with the sample of
Chinese firms to form the respective subsamples for
analysis. Using regression analysis similar tomodel 3-4
on the two subsamples constructed, we find that, for
the subsample with less experienced Western firms,
the coefficient of the interaction term IPR change in
force×Chinese firm is negative and significant (−39, p <
0.001). By contrast, the magnitude of the effect is much
smaller (−3.19) and not significant for the subsample
with more experienced Western firms. The result from
this analysis further supports Hypothesis 3.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The formal intellectual property rights regime pro-
vides the rule of law and incentive system to encourage
innovation. Policy makers in transitional economies
such as China have taken major steps toward standard-
izing and clarifying such regimes to foster innovative
activities. Thus, with the strengthening of IPR protec-
tion after China’s patent law reform of 2001, we expect
firms operating in China to increase their adoption of
the improved form of IPR—utility model patents—to
safeguard their internationally valuable innovations.
We examine important patents applied for and granted
to the same technology (by the same firm) in both
China and the United States to better account for the
quality of such technologies developed in China, and
we find support in our empirical results. More intrigu-
ingly, we find that Chinese andWestern firms in China
exhibit a significant difference in their response to the
patent law reform. Chinese firms, in general, do not
increase their application of such internationally valu-
able patents (after an improvement in their protection)
as much as their Western counterparts.
In this study, we seek to explain the difference in the
responses between Chinese andWestern firms from an
institutional theory perspective. We argue that because
of the relativelyweak and inefficient formal institutions
in China and the complex and ambiguous interde-
pendence between institutional forces, Chinese firms
are deeply embedded in China’s informal institutions
to advance private interest, access political or social
capital, and optimize performance. This may result
in Chinese firms’ stickiness or lack of responsiveness
to formal institutional changes as they tend to rely
more on informal norm-based approaches and infor-
mal guanxi networks (Batjargal et al. 2013, Holmes et al.
2013, Webb et al. 2009). This behavioral tendency may
be manifested in their resorting less to formal legal liti-
gations and protection mechanisms against the poten-
tial expropriation of their innovations compared with
Western firms.
Moreover, we find that the difference in the adoption
of the strengthened utility model patents between Chi-
nese andWestern firms becomes less pronounced with
increasing de facto institutional quality of the IPR and
legal system in regionswhere firms conduct their R&D.
This finding suggests that although the formal IPR
institutions in China are generally quite weak, which
reinforces Chinese firms’ greater embeddedness in and
reliance on informal institutions, Chinese firms are less
embedded in the informal institutions in regions with
high de facto IPR quality. In those regions, Chinese
firms and their strategies are more responsive to and
can better take advantage of the clearer formal rules
to protect their intellectual assets. Consequently, their
response to the formal IPR regime shift becomes more
like that of theirWestern counterparts in those regions.
Furthermore, we find that the difference in the adop-
tion of the strengthened utility model patents between
Western and Chinese firms becomes smaller with
increasing operational experience of Western firms in
China. This finding suggests that although informal
norms and practices that advance Chinese firms’ pri-
vate interests and optimize performance are formed
over time, they are not completely inaccessible to out-
siders. With constant exposure to the norms and prac-
tices of their Chinese counterparts and the pressure
to conform to the host-country institutional environ-
ment, Western firms can better understand and adapt
to China’s informal institutions through experiential
learning. Thus, with increasing operational experience
in China, Western firms’ patenting strategies to for-
mal IPR regime shift can become more like those of
Chinese firms.
This study makes the following contributions. First,
we extend prior literature on the substitutive rela-
tionship between formal and informal institution by
proposing that this is a complex relationship that
can be subject to stickiness in firms’ response to the
change in institutional environment. We substanti-
ate this argument by drawing upon and integrating
theoretical perspectives from institutional embedded-
ness of firms and strategies to suggest that firms’
deep embeddedness in informal institutionsmay cause
organizational resistance and insensitivity to changes
in formal institutions (Greenwood and Hinings 1996,
Peng 2003, Zucker 1991). As such, the improved for-
mal institution does not immediately substitute for, or
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reduce a firm’s reliance on, the informal institution
if the firm has been deeply embedded in the exist-
ing informal institutions. Such investigation into the
complex substitutive relationship between formal and
informal institutions can advance our understanding
of firms’ heterogeneous responses to the improvement
in a country’s formal institutions. It might also help
explain why certain changes in the formal institutions
may face greater resistance than others to take effect.
As such, our institutional embeddedness framework
supplements the liability of foreignness argument from
international business (e.g., Zaheer 1995, Zaheer and
Mosakowski 1997, Mezias 2002) and provides more
nuanced insights. Indeed, the degree of institutional
embeddedness in the local market may constitute an
important source of not only the liability of foreign-
ness but also the behavior difference between foreign
firms and domestic firms in responding to institutional
changes. An implication for emerging economies is
that simply transplanting and imposing formal rules
that had worked well in the developed economies
without consideration of the local context and the intri-
cate interactions between these formal rules and (local)
informal institutions may not be the optimal approach
to improving the overall institutional environment to
encourage innovation.
Second, previous studies consider how entrepre-
neurs and firms acquire critical resources given the
complex interaction between formal and informal insti-
tutions (e.g., Batjargal et al. 2013, Hiatt and Sine 2014,
Hitt et al. 2004, Holmes et al. 2013, Tonoyan et al.
2010). The literature also emphasizes how a changed
institutional environment in relation to normative,
cognitive, and regulative dimensions provides new
entrepreneurial opportunities, rationales, and neces-
sary resources for firms to exploit (Hiatt et al. 2009,
Tolbert et al. 2011). We add to this stream of liter-
ature on the substitution effect between formal and
informal institutions in emerging economies by sug-
gesting possible mechanisms firms may use to pro-
tect their innovations and intellectual assets through
alternative informal institutions. Althoughwe find that
those firms deeply embedded in the existing informal
institutions might be slow in changing their way of
conducting R&D and protecting innovation outputs,
the process might be different for a firm’s resource
acquisition during formal institutional changes. This is
a potential avenue for future studies.
Moreover, scholars have called for more attention
on agency and discretion of organizations to explain
the variation in organizational conformity to exoge-
nous coercive change in formal institutions (e.g., Hiatt
et al. 2009, Hiatt and Park 2013). The organizational
consequences of changes in formal institutions are not
always anticipated (Hiatt et al. 2009), and we sug-
gest that the existing informal institutions will play
a critical role in influencing the consequences. This
perspective can also add to the stream of literature
that has used social movement perspective to exam-
ine how the informal (i.e., normative and cognitive)
aspects of the institutional environments can be influ-
enced by the social movement, and subsequently affect
firms’ strategic response and entrepreneurial behav-
ior (Sine and David 2003, Tolbert et al. 2011). We have
only started to unravel the complexity in how formal
and informal institutions interact. Further exploration
in this direction will enrich our understanding of the
antecedents and consequences of such interaction.
Third, we leverage an exogenous event of a top-
down, major IPR law change, which helps mitigate
the concern for reverse causality and endogeneity. This
study complements prior research in this area, which
mostly focused on variation in institutional environ-
ment and firm strategies at specific points in time
across countries (e.g., Batjargal et al. 2013, Hitt et al.
2004). Our research setting and novel design, including
the construction and use of transnational China–U.S.
patent dyads, allowus to compare the differences in the
temporal responses of Chinese and Western firms to
the same exogenous change in formal institution across
regions within one country.
5.1. Limitations and Future Research Directions
Our study has several limitations that may present
fruitful avenues for future research. First, our inter-
est in the current study lies in understanding firms’
innovation and patenting strategies for internationally
important and valuable innovations. We operational-
ize this by analyzing the entire population of Chi-
nese patents with matching U.S. patents assigned to
these firms. Furthermore, by focusing on this subset of
important and valuable patents, we are able to control
for technology quality and filter out “junk” patents. If
infringed upon, these more valuable patents, on aver-
age, could gain more attention from the firms own-
ing them and from legal enforcement agencies, making
themmore likely to be enforced through the formal liti-
gation process. To the extent that the protection ofmore
valuable patents is subject to the influence of informal
institutions, we expect that the observed effects might
be even stronger for less important/valuable patents.
In addition, as the United States is the largest and
most important and technologically sophisticated mar-
ket in the world, and as firms typically seek patents in
the United States when patenting beyond the country
of technological origin (China in this case), we have
captured the majority of such internationally valuable
inventions. Nevertheless, future studies could extend
this approach by including other types of patents
granted to the firms and Chinese patents matched to
patents from other foreign countries, such as those in
Europe.
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Second, our study examines regional variation in
de facto IPR quality at the Chinese provincial level.
The province is China’s basic and constant adminis-
trative unit by which most economic policies are for-
mulated and economic activities are organized and
managed. This measure is also reasonably stable over
time and is not highly correlated with other commonly
used regional economic development indicators (such
as GDP, GDP per capita, or population). Moreover, it
has been used and validated in previous studies (Fan
et al. 2010). Nevertheless, such classification of de facto
IPR quality may still be rather crude. While we have
introduced an alternative measure, de facto legal pro-
tection based on NERI surveys to firms, future studies
could consider another fine-grained measure of local
IPR quality, like those at the subprovincial level.
Third, although our study has provided the theoret-
ical logic and framework behind how Chinese firms
engage in informal institutional norms and bureau-
cratic practices to resolve IPR-related conflicts as an
alternative to formal institutional protection in IPR,
we are not able to directly observe them in the cur-
rent study. We are also not aware of any such pub-
licly available and reliable data at a disaggregated
level in China. We have attempted to mitigate this
concern through our supplemental analyses on institu-
tional embeddedness by testing for the effects of gov-
ernmental and legal institutional distances of Western
firms from China and the application of Hofstede’s
culture dimensions based on “Confucian dynamism”
(i.e., LTO). Although such analyses help shed light on
the institutional mechanisms and rule out some poten-
tial alternative explanations, they cannot eliminate the
concern entirely. Future studies could consider col-
lecting and incorporating data directly capturing such
informal institutional practices by Chinese firms. The
intricacies and dynamics of the interaction—both tem-
porally and spatially—between formal and informal
institutions, especially in emerging economies, present
an exciting avenue for future studies.
5.2. Policy and Strategy Implications
Our findings have policy implications for the govern-
ments of China and other emerging economies that
face major regulatory changes. In addition to under-
standing the importance of technological knowledge
protection and firms’ governance choices, policy mak-
ers can encourage innovative and patenting activities
of firms by designing and implementing more effec-
tive formal laws to reinforce the current IPR regime.
Moreover, when formulating policy to stimulate inno-
vation, they should consider the informal institutional
norms and practices by firms, and the quality of local
IPR systems, which have a substantial influence on the
effectiveness of formal regime reforms. By shedding
light on the potential mechanisms that could lead to
differential responses by Chinese and foreign firms to
formal IPR regime change, this study could offer useful
implications for macrolevel innovative activities and
help policy makers better assess the effectiveness of
IPR policies.
Our findings also have strategy implications for Chi-
nese andWestern firms that engage in innovation activ-
ities in China. While it may be effective for Chinese
firms to rely on China’s informal institutions to resolve
IPR conflicts in the Chinese market, it could pre-
vent these firms from accumulating experiences and
developing capabilities in dealing with formal insti-
tutions. These experiences and capabilities are impor-
tant for Chinese firms to compete effectively in the
global arena. On the other hand, Western firms should
gain a greater understanding of China’s local con-
text, including its informal norms and practices. It
may yield long-term benefits like developing better
insights of the innovation strategies used by their Chi-
nese competitors and becoming more adept with alter-
native nonlegal and potentially less costly strategies to
resolve IPR-related disputes and protect their intellec-
tual assets in transitional economies such as China.
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Endnotes
1Following previous studies in the innovation literature (e.g., Hall
and Ziedonis 2001, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002), we exclude SIPO
design patents. Conceptually, design patents form a distinct class
of intellectual property assets of a very different nature that is less
applicable to the technological innovations we focus on in this study.
2The level of regional economic development does not always cor-
relate well with and can vary from regional de facto IPR quality or de
facto legal protection. To check, comparing economic indicators such
as gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, and population of
each of the 31 Chinese provincial regions to their de facto IPR quality
shows pairwise correlations of 0.65 (p < 0.001), 0.77 (p < 0.001), and
0.10 (p < 0.10), respectively. Comparing de facto legal protection with
these indicators shows pairwise correlations of 0.42 (p < 0.001), 0.52
(p < 0.001), and 0.10 (p < 0.10), respectively.
3We further verified this condition through informal interviewswith
patent attorneys in China and the United States and legal scholars in
leading universities in China such as Tsinghua University. Further-
more, we manually checked a random sample of SIPO utility model
and invention patents obtained directly from the SIPO database and
did not find any exception to this condition.
4Firms from Hong Kong and Macau are excluded from the Chinese
firm category. Including the patents filed by companies from these
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regions in the robustness analyses yielded consistent results.Western
firms include those from the United States, Germany, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Sweden, Italy, Netherlands,
Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Spain, and Norway.
5Note that the examination and final granting of a patent in each
country is independent of the others. Although a firm can choose
(or not) to go through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), which
provides a unified procedure for the possibility of filing an interna-
tional application (i.e., a PCT application) in each of its contracting
countries, it does not provide for a multinational (or international)
patent (which does not exist). The reason is that the grant of patent
is usually a prerogative of each national or regional authority (with
few exceptions) and subject to the stringent patent examination and
review procedure administered by individual countries.
6For example, USPTO patent approval rate dropped from about 72%
in 2000 to 44% in 2008 (Wild 2008). The SIPO has a similar approval
rate of about 44% for invention patents from 1985 to 2007 (SIPO
2008b).
7Our informal interviews with patent attorneys in the United States
and China as well as legal scholars at Tsinghua University in China
suggest that a technology awarded a USPTO invention patent will
usually be able to pass the bar for a SIPO invention patent as well as
utility model patent since the USPTO typically has a more stringent
patent examination and granting process.
8Even in the case that the technology only qualifies for a SIPO utility
model patent but not a SIPO invention patent, it should not affect
our theoretical prediction or empirical operation. We still expect to
observe a higher likelihood of applying for the utility model patent
after the improvement in its clarity, legal protection, strength, and
enforceability as a result of the IPR regime change. Consistent with
our theory, the greater increase in likelihood of application for West-
ern firms than Chinese firms may be due to their differential embed-
dedness in China’s informal institutions.
9The NERI index for market development in China consists of sev-
eral indices covering different government, enterprise, economic,
and legal aspects of the Chinese provincial-level regions. It is com-
puted using data from the China statistical yearbooks, reports from
the administrations of industry and commerce, and enterprise and
household surveys. For more details, please refer to Fan et al. (2011).
10We suggest that it may not be necessary to determine the propor-
tion of increase from each possibility as both are consistent with our
theoretical arguments that firms respond differentially to improve-
ment in formal protection of IPR; that is, the improvement in the
strength, clarity, legal protection, and enforceability of utility model
patents after the 2001 IPR regime shift may induce firms to rely more
on the utility model patent as a formal IPR protection than other
alternative means to safeguard the firms’ intellectual assets.
11Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Murray and Stern 2007, Jaffe
and Trajtenberg 2002), Chinese firm/Western firm is an indicator vari-
able that captures whether at least one of the patent assignees is
a Chinese firm/Western firm. As a robustness check, we construct
an alternative Chinese firm/Western firm variable that denotes that all
patent assignees must be Chinese firms/Western firms. Analyses
using either variable yield consistent and robust results.
12As we would expect, the variables de facto IPR quality and de facto
legal protection are highly correlated (0.76, p < 0.001). This provides
one indication of the consistency of the alternative measure.
13Substituting the control variable cumulative citations in the main
regression models with cumulative citation without firm self-citation,
which provides an alternative control for the quality (or value) of
the patented technology to nonfocal firms (that are not assigned the
patent), yields similar and consistent results.
14While we label technology sectors in aggregate as technology
sector controls in the regression tables, we note that technology
sectors are significant in our models. For example, chemical, com-
puting, information technology, and communications are significant
in Model 3-3; information technology and communications are sig-
nificant in Model 3-4. The results suggest that the patenting choice
of firms in China is affected by specific technology sectors of the
patents.
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